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Inか’oduction’
There　might　be　three　major　Christian　attitudes　toward　other　religions　in
contemporary　theology：exclusivism，　inclusivism　in　Karl　Rahner’s　sense　of
‘‘`nonymous　Christianity”as血is　refbrs　to　the　sta1血s　of　a　rightfUI　religion
other　than　Christianity，　and　the　transfbrmation　of　inclusivism　illto　a　deeper
perspective　whether　it　is血om　the　standpoint　of　Logos　Christology，
represented　by　Katsumi　Takizawa｛and　John　B．　Cobb，　Jr．，20r　theocentdsm　as
professed　by　Paul　F．　Knitter　and　John　Hick．3Karl　Barth　is　believed　by　many
to　be　one　of　the　st【ongest　proponents　of　theological　exclusivism　To　be　sure，
as　far　as　his　vieWpoint　is　concerned　in　Church　Dognatics　V2，　Sec．17．“The
Revelation　of　God　as　the　Abolition　of　Religio耳，”3．‘‘Tme　Religion，”this
is　the　case．　However，　in　Church　Dognatics　IV／3，　Sec．69．‘‘The　Gloly　of　the
Mediator，”2．“Light　of　Life，”Barth　makes　an　iMportant　tUrn　ffom　this
position　to　an　inclusivist　attitude　toward　visiolls　of　reality　other　than
Christianity．　With血is　new　attitUde　he　now　can　affirrn　the　knowledge　of　God
as　available　even　outside　the　walls　of　the　Church；and　thus　he　is　predicated
upOn　the　capacity　of　Jesus　Christ　who　transcendS　the　1imits　of　the　sphere　of
the　Church．
　　血lmy　op血ion，　if　Ba曲wanted　to　be　thoroughly　oonsistent　here，　he　would
have　to　distinguish，　as　does　TakiZawa，　the　Word　of　Go¢　who　primordially
exists“with”every　one　of　us　at　the　bOttom　of　our　existence　from　the　name
of　Jesus　Christ　as　the　lncarnation　of　the　Word，　and　regard　the　fbmler　as
irreversibly　prior　to，　although　inseparable丘om，　the　latter．　As　a　conseq口ence，
Barth°s　new　perspective　of　inclusivism　might　undergo　a　radical　change　of
scope．　Christianity，s　positioll　of　includ血1g　the血11血s　of　other　religions　j血its
own　idea　of　the　Lord，　the　name　of　Jesus　Christ，　is，’Ibelieve，　to　be
transfbmled　into　its　position　of　being　unambiguously　and　unreservedly
2included，　together　with　other　visions　of　reality，　within　the　reality　of　the
Word　of　God　as　such　or　the　Logos．
　　Unfbrtunately，　Ba曲ls　position　regarding　theological　inclusivism　is　rather
unclear．　Therefbre，　it　is　admittedly　beyond　the　reach　of　his　theologica1
山i曲gto　suggest血any　significant　manner　how　to　cope　wi舳e　question
that　lies　at　the　heart　of　the　trImsfbmed　and　deeper　inclusivism：In　what
mamer　or　sense　call　we　say　that　the　Logos　illcludes　everything　in　the　world？
Is　there　any　legitimate　limit　to　the　capacity　of　the　Logos　in　the　matter　of
㎞clusion？If　so，　what　is　tllat？In　this　respecちIbelieve　we　have　to　engage　in
a　strictly　theological　del㎞itation　of　the　said　inclusivism．4
　　0ne　of　the　ways　in　which　we　can　most　properly　carry　out　this　task，　it
seems　to　me，　is　to　reflect　upon　the　problem　of　God（or　of　the　Word　of　God）
in　the　light　of　the　Buddhist　claim　that　the　ultimate　mature　of　things　is　empty．
Since　the　Buddllist　tmth－claim　is　an　ultimate　claim，　as　is　the　Cllristian　tmth－
claim　that　God（or　the　Word　of　God）is　all－inclusive，　we　can　reasonably
assume　that　there　is　at　least　what　Langdon　Gilkey　calls　a‘‘rough　parity”
between　them．
　　The　purpose　of　this　paper　is　to　elucidate　and　articulate　how　these　two
considerations　of（1）the　difference　between　two　kinds　of　theologica1
血clusion　and（2）the　necessity　fbr　the　delhnitation　of血e　transfbrmed　and
deeper　inclusivism　by　comparison　with　Buddhist　Emptiness（or　absolute
nothingness）are　intemally　related　to　Barth，s　argument　in　his　l　931　work，
Anselm’Fides　guaerens　lnte〃ectum．5　This　motif，　even　althougll　Bar血ts
straightfbrward　denial　of　apologetics　i11（7hurch　Dognatics，　published　since
1932，has　long　suppressed　the　abovementioned　twofbld　inclhlation　to　come
to　the　jbre　ill　contemporaly　Protestant　dleology　as　wen　as　in　Barth，s　own
thillking．
LPreliminary　Considerations：An　lncongruity　in　Barth，s　Theologica且
　Scheme
　　Prior　to　a　discussion　of　the　text　of．Anselm．’Fides　S2uaerens　Inte〃ectU〃l
from　the　aforementioned　perspecti’ve，　a　word　about　an　incongruity　in　Bamh，s
theological　scheme　may　be　in　order．　For　what　he　means　by
“incomparability”ias　coteminous　with“sovereignty，”“absoluteness，”
“positiveness，”and“unmanageableness”jis，　if　1　am　correct，　basically
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different血scope丘om　what　he　calls　o句ectivity（Ger．，　G¢gθ競伽dlichkeit
which㎞plies“relatedness”or“intelligibility”）．
　　First，　fbr　Barth，　just　as　for　Anselm，　our　theological　thinking　is
necessitated　by　the“illcomparable，　sovereign　obj　ect，”God，　in　whom　we
believe．　Accordingly，　theology　must　necessarily　begin　in　and　with　fi疵h　in
the　capacity　of　pulchritudo　or　beauty　befbre　it　can　involve　itself　with　the
polemical　obligation　of　I　Peter　3：15，　i．e．，　intelligere　or　pro加ハg．　From　the
viewpoint　of　the　possibility　of　theology，　it　appears　that　the　same　movement
of／ides　guaerens　in　tellectum　is　enabled　by　the　self」disclosure　of　God　in
Jesus　C㎞st．】h　1血is　sense，　credere　is血e　presupPosition　of　intelligere．
　　S㏄ond，　when　it　comes　to　conside血g　the“o切ectivity”of　God，　however，
B舳has　to　presuppose，　as　does　Anse㎞，　a　so畑f　na加lal　theology　in　his
own　revealed　tlleology．　One　such　example　is　the　idea　of　donum　g7atiae
found　in　Anselm’s　opening　prayer　in　the　Proslogt°on　which　refers，　accordng
to　B磁h，　to　the“a伽alization　of　that　power　to　know　which　was　originally
created　in　man”isee　Romans　1：20）．　In　other　words，　God“shows”Godself
and　makes　Godself　gegenst伽〃’c乃（血at　is，　relational　or　intelligible）to　us　ill
terms　of　his　objectivity（Ger．，　Gegensta’ndlichkeitl）．　h　this　case，　of　course，
what　is　presuppOsed　is　the　fact　that　in　its　depths　the　objectivity　in　question　is
the　intra－T1由ritarian　life　of　God　as　it　has　been　clearly　perceived　in　the　things
that　have　been　made（Romans　1：20）．
　　At　any　rate，　the　incomparability　of　God，　mentioned　above，　would　make
sense　Only　against　the　background　of　this　objectivity．　However，　it　seems　to
me　that　Barth　is　not　always　clear　about　the　relationship　between　the　two
notions　or　dimellsions　of　the　Deity；th侍re　is　an　incongruity　here　in　his
system．　The　incongnlity　would　be　contingent，　in　my　view，　upOn　the　fact血at
he　has　not　really　succeeded　in　conceiving　fUlly　and　apPropriately　the
location　of　God　in　the　universe　in　relation　to　its　me壌physical　backgmmd，
1血eintra－Trinitarian　obj　ectivity　or　Godhead（Ger．，　die　inner－Trinitarische
Go励θめ，　whicll　would　tie　i11，　at　least　categorically　or　dimensionally，　with
the　Buddhist　notioll　of　Empthless．
II．　The　Problem　of　the“Name”of　GOd　in　Barth璽s　Argument3　Toward　a
　　C璽arification　of　the　Forma艮Pam皿elism　BetWeen　AnseRm，s　Proof　of
　　the翫istence　of　God　and　N西g岡una°s　Dialectic　of　Emp血ess
4　　Here，　Iet　me　refer　back　to　the　two　issues　mentioned　earlier　in　tlle
intrOducto】ry　section　in　the　light　of　what　I　have　established　in　the　previous
section：
（1）Theological　inclusivism　of　the飾st　type　is　in　principle　based　upoll　the
　　Christian　revelation．　By　contrast，　the　transfbrmed　and　deeper
　　血clusivism　may　correspOnd　to血e　objectivity　of　GOd　as血is　reflects
　　and　explesses　i血itself　a　deeper　dimension　of　reality　whence　it　comes，
　　namely，　the　intra－Trinitarian　Godllead．　It　may　be　noted　that　Barth
　　begins　to　designate　this　deeper　reality　of　Godhead　in　C加アc乃
　　1）ogmatics　IIl　l，　as“the　primary　objectivity　of　God”（Ger．，　die
　　primdre　Gegenst伽〃iohkeit　Gottes）in　disti血ction　to　the　one　we　have
　　been　spe｛面ng　o£由at　is，　our　knowledge　of　God　as　enabled　by　GOd．
（2）One　of　the　major　intentions　in　this　paper　is　to　delimit　theological
　　　inclusivism　in　the　second，　deeper　sense　by　way　of　tracing　the
　　　6切ectivity　of　God　back　to　its　origin．　The　odgin　expresses　itself　within
　　the　purview　of　our　text；only，　if　my　hypothesis　is　correct，　hl　telms　of
　　　nihil．　That　is，　I　observe　what　is　parallel　with　the　afbrementioned
　　　Godllead　in　the　nihil　contained　in　the　naming　of　God　by　Anselm　as
　　a’iquid　quoπ’痂1　maius　cogitari　po∬it（or　potest）［that　than　which
　　nothing　greater　can　be　oonceived】．This　hypothesis　needs血en　to　be
　　verified．
　　In　order　to　verifシthe　hypothesis，　it　might　be　methodologically　and
heuristically　worthwhile　to　attend　to　the　fact　that　there　is　a　parallelism
betWeen　what　is　at　stake　most　recently　in　contemporary　theology　in　terms　of
anew　Cllristian　theology　of　religions　and　the　composition　of　Barth，s
argument　in　his　book．　As　has　already　been　mentioned，　theological
inclusivism　of　the血Bt膿gives　way　to　i的位ansformed　and　deepened　type
which　is　yet　to　be　delimited　by　the　ultimate　metaphysical　claim　of　Buddhism
of　Emptiness。　By　the　same　token，　within　the　purview　of　our　text，　Barth
discusses　the“Name　of　God”and　the“puestio 　of　the　Existence　of　God”
from　the　perSpective　of　revealed　theology　and　its　ontological　depth　befbre
ente血1g　illto　the　content　of　the“Proof　of　the　Existence　of　God”in　both
general　and　specific　temls　based　upon　Anselm’s　Proslogt’on　2　and　3．
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　　In　the　present　and　next　sections　of　this　paper，　accordingly，　I　shall　deal
with　the　problems　of　the‘「Name”and‘‘Existence”of　God，　as　they　are
discussed　by　Barth　in　his　book　in　Ch．　II，　A．“The　PresupPosition　of　the
koof，”垂窒?撃奄高奄獅≠窒奄撃凵@by　reference　to　the　formal　and　material　parallelism
betWeen　Anselm’s　thought｛and　Nagaijuna°s．　In　this　sense，面s　whole　paper　is
still　provisional　and　preparatory　in　character．　It　intends　to　provide　a
methodological－cum－heuristic　instrument　by　which　to　analyze　and　re－
intepret　Buddhistically　Bar血壁s　main　arg㎜ent　fbr　the“Existence　of　God”
as　developed　in　Ch．　II，　B．“The　Development　of血e　Proof（Commentary　on
Proslogion　2－4）．，，6
1．7乃θハ「a〃昭qプσ04
　　Barth　first　attends　to　the　Name　of　God　by　noticing　that　in　this　name
Anselm　is　66under　this　prohibition：he　can　conceive　of　nothing　greater，　to　be
precise，‘better，l　beyond　God　without　lapsillg　into　the　absurdity，　excluded
for　faith，　of　placing　himself　above　God㎞attempting　to　conceive　of　this
greater”iAFQI，77）．　For　Barth（as　he　argues　with　and　for　Anselm），　the
Existence　of　God　is　given，　in　other　words，　as　an　article　of　faith，　and　this
Existence　of　Go｛L　accepted㎞faith，　is　now　to　be　recognized　alld　proposed
on　the　presupposition　of　the　Name　of　God　1ikewise　accepted　in　faith　and　is
to　be　understood　as　necessary　for　thought．　h　this　sense，　the　Name　of　God，
as　an　article　of　faith，　gives　rise・’o　though〆（i〃’θ〃ゴgerCノーto　use　Paul
Ricoeur曾s　famous　phraseology　in　7he　Symbolism　ofEvil．　It　fbllows　that　fbr
Anselm　the　only　tenable　epistemological　p血1ciple　is　this：Nullus　inte〃fgε器
id　quod　deus　est，　potest　cogitare　quia　deus　non　est　（：No　one　who　understa血ds
what　God　is　call　think　that　God　does　not　exist】．
　　It　is　important　to　note　that　Banh　regards　．this　epistemological　principle　as
developed　hl出e　actual　procedure　of　1血e‘‘Proof　of　1血e　Existence　of　God”
by　Anselm　in　the　following　three　senses：
［1】St　arting　ftOm廿盛s　point　of　the　Credo，　the　other血ing，電he　Existence　of
God」must　make　itself－not　credible（it　is　that　aheady）－but　intelligible．
The　choice　of　this　particular　pOinち　the　discovery　of　this　partioular　Name　of
God，　was　the丘rst　step　along　the　path　that　was　to　commit　him　to　the
development　of　the　Pmof
6［2】T㎞tit㎞a咽sig面cm㏄㎞11㎞舳ws　jus幡㎜（）h・ftOm・the
manner　in　which　he　reports　his　discovery　in　the　PrologUe　as丘om　the
manner　in　which　he　defended　it　later　against　（iaunilo．
【3］We　can　be　ccr面n：漁皿ev㎝ts　this㎞sゆdoes　not　lead　away丘om
血eccmstraint　of騨ifica皿y　theologicaI血inking　but　ra血θr　leads］dgbt　intO
it；it　concerns　the　choice　of血e　concrete　limit　which　so　far　as　this　question　is
concenied　apPears　to　make　knowledgeIPossible．（AFQ兀　78）
　　First，　Anse㎞，s　epistemological　principle　has　had　itS　initia1　st〔rp　in　the　facち
as　mentioned　in　the　Prologue　of　the　Proslogion，　that　he　has　intuitively
discovered　the　afbresaid　Name　of　God　after　a　long　search，　many　a
digression，　and　even　despair，　as　mentioned　in　the　Prologue　of　the
Proslogt’oη．　The　Name　is　thus　presupposed　bOth　in　Prosl．2－4　regardillg　the
proof　of　the　existe！1ce　of　God（in　tenns　of　its　nec6ssity）and　in　ProsZ．5－26
regarding　the　proof　of　the　nature　of　God（in　temls　of　its　perfection　and
unique　originality）．　Second，　the　epistemological　principle，　as　attested　above，
is　critically　operative　throughout　what　Anselm　himself　calls‘‘駕η“〃2
argumen伽＿ad・a伽θ励醒，9蜘伽s・vere・est・et・summum伽〃卿”ia
simple　argument＿to　demonstrate　that（1）God　truly［really］exists，　that（2）
He　is　the　S叩reme　Good），　which．is　canied　out　in血e　Proslogion　alld　the
Reply　to　Gaunilo．　Tllird，　tlle　epistemological　principle　corresponds　to　the
core　of　the　right　theological　thh止h19：血at　it　is　conditioned　by　the　prevenient
and　co。opera血99race　of　God（cf　AFQI，37）．
2．1望7乃ree，プわ〃Formal」Paハa〃2ゐ曽〃i　BetWeen　the　Na〃ze　ofGod　andハた78冒7ヴμπα驚
　Argument　　　　　’
　　Here　it　might　be　worth　noticing　that　there　is　a　sort　of　paral豆elism，　at　least
in　terms　of　their　respective　formal　cllaracteristics，　between　the
epistemological　princip豆e　in　question　and　the　Buddhist　epistemological
principle　of　Emptiness，　as　it　is　radically　reforrnulated　and　aniculated　anew
upon　the　basis　of　the　P吻’fiapδr「amitd　logic　of　contractions　by　the　great
Mahayanist　reformer　Nagatjuna（ca．150－ca．250　C．E．）in　his　magmml　opus，
筋e　Maめ7amakO　K励1’伽This　parallelism，　as　I　perceive　it，　is　threefbld　in
nature．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　グ　　First，　for　Nagarjuna，　the　p血ciple　of　Emptiness（Skt．，　Stin［yata），　in　the
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sense　that　“all　things　are　empty，”　is　presupPosed　throughout　the　twenty－
seven　1【δ7ゼ肋5　and　cu㎞血ates血the　insight　that　“Emptiness　is　itself　emp¢y．卿
This　insight　radically　relinquishes　the　Hinaydnist　dichotomy　between
Nirvaqa　and　Sa血s訂a．In　the　Hi　nayanaor　Theravada　Buddhistsg　vision　of
reality　there　still　remains　a　final　dichotomy；and　this　dichotomy　lies　betWeen
血e漁㎞ent　of　Ni繭a　by血e　realization　o舳e　egolessness　of血e　so－
called　individual（Skt．，pudgala－naira“　tmアの，　concomitant　with　a
thoroughgoing　analysis　of　the　so－called　self　or且tman　into　its　constituent
dharma　or　element，　and　the　phenomena藍world　of　Sa血血a　which　consists　i11，
the　adshlg　of　the　dharma　consdtuting　Personality血de卿dence　on　causes
and　conditions（that　is，、pr「atiリノa－samutpdda　or　dependent　co－orig血ation）．
Naga巾na’s　insight　into“universal　emptiness”or　the“emptiness　of　all
dhamlas”i arva－dhannαStiiryata），　however，　lures　us　into　the　vision　of　the
sameness　of　all　dharma（sarva－dharma－smata）．　Now，　as　Theodore
Stcherbatsky　emphatically　remarks，“there　is　not　a　sllade　of　difference
be伽ee蹴the　Absolute　and曲pheno血繊∂θ為ヴeen　nかvd理a　and　saninsdra．”　8
This　whole　procedure　of　the　proof　of“universal　emptiness”by　N5g麺una
is　sllot　through　with　both　a　persistent　logica1“垂≠狽?hand　an extra－logical
“血st　steP，”intUition，　just　as　is　Anse㎞璽s　proof　of　the　existence　of　God．
　　S㏄on¢fbr　Nag麺u鴫血e　p血ciple　of　Emptiness　is　a血epistemological
instrument　that　is　thoroughly　critica1．　Since　it　is　critical　of　everything，
includ　ng　itSelf，　and　silce　it　cuiminates，　as　we　observed　above，　in　the　insight
that　Emptiness　is　itself　empty，　it　takes　illto　account　what　NagEijuna　terms
the　“messities　of騨h”（‘SabdU〃置ε卯掘のαρ7矧碗＠∫ψノin　the／lfadya〃eakα
撫㎜：18；㎜1：11．It　follows血at　al1　elements－incl曲g　sense
data，　consciousness，　feeling，　volitions　tllat　were　declared　by　the　early
Hinayana　Schools（esp．　the　Sautrantika）as　ultimate　realities－become
relative　and　nomlal，　and　rel醐vity幽ηソ薦りitself　is　but　a　nolninal“middle
path”tO　approachng　reality．　Thus　for　NEgECjuna，血e　p血ciple　of　Emptiness
discloses　itself　as　the　middle　path　hl　criticizi皿g　both　a　mere　worldliness，　in
the　sense　of　materialism　or　nihilism，　and　a　mere　other－worldliness，　in　the
sense　of　the　Hinayanist　clinging　to　Nirv的a　or　eternalism．　In　its
methodological　capacity，　this　principle　is　profblmdly　akin　to　the　way　hl
which　the　66incomprehensibility　of　God”constitutes　fbr　Anselm　such　an
article　of　faith　as　gives　rise　to　knowledge伽elligere），　rather　than　that
8skepticism　of　the　pOssibility（mahltained　by　Anse㎞）of　the㎞owledge　of
GOd　which　is　professed　by　Gaunilo　in　his（critique　of　Anselm’s　argument．
　　Third，　for　Nagat加na，　the　p血ciple　of　Emptiness　is　the　constraint　upon　his
tlinking　in　such　a　way　tllat　it　drives　him　to　conclude　that　Nirvai1a　is　the
phenomenal　world　as　it　is　viewed　from　the　perspective　of　Emptiness
emptying　itSelf　as　an　objectifiable　reality．　Logically　spea㎞［g，　the　constraint
of　Emptiness　drives　us　to　negate　all　the　altematives　of　the　fbur－comered
dialectic（catuSkOのin　tlle　fbllowing　manner：（1）NirvaOa　is　not　all　Ells
（ゐ赫vαor　a　particular　existing　elltity）；（2）Nirvapa　is　not　a　non－Ens（abhdVa
or　a　non－existent　entity）；（3）Nirvapa　is　not　both　an　Ens　and　a　non－Ens
togetller；a血d（4）nor　is　Nirva4a　a　negation　of　bo1血an　Ens　and　a　non－Ens
toge血er（see　CBN，97－99）．
　　Thus，　finally，　precisely　by　virtue　of　the　constraint　of　Emptiness　qua
negativity，　we　arrive　at　the　full　affirmatioll　of　Sa血s5ra　the　world　of
dependent　co－orig血ation（ρratiり7α一samuiPδda）in　its　suchness．　Helre　it　is　of
u賃㎝ost噸血nce　to　recognize，　wi血Yokichi　Yajima，肱it　is　one皿d
the　same　world　of　dependent　co－origination　once　totally　negated　that　is
丘nally　affirmed．91f　we　are　not　awakened　to　this　tnlth　owing　to　our
objectivistic　thinking，　we　perhaps　should　have　our　noses　ya血ked，　as　Dogen
urges，　a血er血e　manner　in　which　Shakyo　yanked　Seido’s　nose　in　order　to　let
him　know　that皿iversal　empt血ess（Jpn．，励♂のis“血our　en伽㎞y，　s㎞，
flesh，　bones　and　mamow．”10
3．濯〃na加ゴ3げσα傭10　M79麗〃昭nt　against　Ansel〃2め・ルfeans　of　the
　　Para〃θ1‘3初
　　Here　Gaunilo，s　di　fferences丘om　Anselmls　position　concernillg　the
incomprehensibility　of　God　will　be　considered（other　issues，　discussed　ill　tlle
original　larger　p叩er　l　l　whose　abridgment　the　pτesent　essay　constitutes，　are
omitted　here）．　Ba曲ascribes　the　epistemological　validity　of　the　conceptioll
of　God　in’the　Proslogion　to　its　peculiar　limitation．　For　Gaunilo，　the　g麗o
maius　cog’伽1°neguit　and　the　word　Deus　are　bOth　epistemologically　invalid
because　each　of　them　is　mere　vox．　According　to　Barth，　this　is　because
Gaunilo　has　overlooked　the　fact　that　this　vox　should　not　be　identified　with
Anselm’s“tem　of　God　which　is　to　some　extent　intelligible”ivox‘DetLs”
aliguatセnus　inte〃igilガlis）．　Whereas　the　content　of　the・レex　‘2）eus”is，　fbr
A　酪Buddhisti♂　Rci皿鵬tion　ofKad　B舳’s　Argun，ent　1br山£　EXistence　of　God血！伽4加’1悔9昭囮昭船厩焔燃　　9
Gaunilo，　only　of　a　noetic　and　not　ofIan　ontic　natUre，　for　Anselm　the　Name　of
God　has　llad　in　itself　the　llomlative　principle　of　theological　epistemology，
gua　prayer，　such　as　in：　‘？＞bηten　tc），1）o〃line，1昭neか’areα1ガtudinem　tUa〃軍＿
3θ4伽吻oα1脚彪η顔η彪〃igere　veri’tatem　tuam”（Lord，　I　do　not　a賃㎝pt
to　comprehend　yQur　subl㎞ity＿but　I　yeam　to　understand　some　measure　of
your　tmth）．
　　It　is　to　be　noted　here　that　the　revelatory　truth，　as止is　i1血eres　in　the　Name
of　God，　fUnctions　as　an　epistemological　constraint　upon　Anselmls
theologizing，　thus　enablillg　him　to　reaffirm－this　time　in　terms　of
‘‘浮獅р?窒唐狽≠獅р奄獅〟C”as　well　as　in　terms　of‘‘faith”－the　Existellce　of　God　as
the　actual　source（arch6）of　all　existences．　T1亘s　is　extremely　akin，　at　least
fbrmally，　to　the　way　in　which　N巨garjuna，　solely　due　to　his　satori　of
Emptiness，　comes　finally　to　the　point　where　one　can，　and　even　should，
aflirm　the　world　of　Sa血sam，or　of　dependellt　co－origination，　because　the
constraint　of　Emptiness　is　thereby　upon　onels　thinking　of　Emptiness
tl11「OUghout．
　　Notwithstandillg　the　threefbld　parallelism　that　has　been　demonstrated　thus
far，　ther｛∋is　neve1血eless　one　big　difference　betWeen　Anselm’s　theology　of
the　Name　of　God　and　Nagaijunals　dialectic　Of　Emptiness．　Whereas　fbr
Anselm，　theology　is　concerned　to　understalld　God　to　some　extent
（aliquatenus）by　means　of　the　Name　of　God，　the　dialectic　of　Emptiness
面ves　N亘gaijuna　to　negate　utterly　everything，　including　Empthless　itself　h
other　words，　whereas　the　fbmer　is　valid　in　the　realm　of“something”
（aliquiの，　the　latter　concems　the　realm　of“absolute　nothingness”（in　the
sense　of　the　negation　of　Emptiness，　a　double　negation）．
　　How　should　we，　then，　think　of血e　relationship　betWeen　the　tWo　mOdes　of
thi1」dng，　Anselm騨s　aliquid　and　Naga巾na，s“absolute　nothingness”？The
tentative　allswer，　which　is　predicated　upon　a　Buddhistic　re㎞te叩retation　of
the　Name　of　God（aliquid　quo　nihil　maius　cogitari’po∬の，　is　as　fbllows：
（1）God　is（m　ly　tO　be　conceived　as　loyal　tt》no面ngness（nihの．　But　this　does
　　not　mean　that　God　is　loyal　to　or　surpassed　by　some血ing　greater　than
　　　Godsdf　The　tru血instead　is　that　no面ngness　to　whi¢h　God　is　loyal　is
　　　励鵡n・t　aliquid，－and　is，　as　s㏄h，　the・G・（血Ut“G・d　bey・nd（㎞”一的
　　use　Paul　Ti皿ich曹s　eX　Pression．
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（2）But　because　God　is　loyal　to　nihil　in血e　realm　of　nothingness　whose
　　　thoroughgoing　articulation　we　can　find　in　the　Buddllist　dialectic　of
　　　Emp血ess，　therefore，　qUite　paradoXic　ally，（㎞is血e　only　one　aliguid　in
　　　tlle　universe　who　can　be　conceived　of　as　supreme　in　the　realm　of
　　　some血ing，血that　GOd　evokes　in　us（：eaturely　loyalty　to　H㎞and　to　our
　　　relationship　to　the　nihil．　Not　even　nothingness　has　this　power，　this
　　　supremacy　in　the　realm　of　sometlling．　Only　God　has　it．　Or，　more
　　　a㏄curately，　Godなit
m．The　Ques伽of　the　EXistence　of　God　in　Barth曾s　Argument：Toward
　　　a　Clarification　of　the　Material　Parallelism　between　Anselm’s　Proof
　　　of　the　Existence　of　God　and　Nagirj　una’s　Fourfold　NegatiQn　in　the
　　　Matter　of　Nir▼舳a
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　●
L7乃θ9翼a吻ηq価θ醸3伽cθ（）fGod
　　It　is　worth　our　special　attention　that　the　meaning　of　the　concept
‘‘??奄唐狽?獅モ?his，　as　Barth　scrutillizes，　clarified　in　1血e　old　boo1らル血ηo如g如η，
in　a　peculiar卑anner．　The　three　phrasesθ∬entia，　e∬e，　existens　sive
subsistens（that　is，　essence，　to　be，　and　existing　or　subsiSting）are　compared
with　one　ano血er，　and　it　is　said　that血ey　are　i血terrelated　as　lzax」lucere，　and
tucens（that　is，1ight，　to　s㎞e，　and　shining）（AFQI，101）．　Bartli　takes　up　this
threefDld　configuration　of　Anselm°s　theological　ontology　in　order　to
elucidate　tlle　special㎞port　of　the　question　of　the　Existence　of　God　j血his
scheme　of　thought．　His’　own　interpretation　of　the　configuration　is血at：
E∬entia　means　POtentiality（potende），θ∬θ血e　reality（備）of　an　object’s
exisむ巳nce．　But　it　is　ca皿ed｛嬬㈱stVe　mb」stStens血1　so蝕r　as　it　exists，　d皿t
is－it　is　best質）keeP　tO　the　negative　de丘nidon－in　so伽as　it　is　m　dオ㏄t　not
ju戚血human　thinking　or　for　human廿血k血9．（AFQI，90）
　　Now，　Banh　goes血rther　to　place　alongside　the　aforecited　interpretation　of
the　Monologt°on　passage，　what　he　hears　in　the　Proslogt°on　and　in　the／Answer
to　Gaunilo　about　the　concept　of　Existence．　What　matters　here　is　Anselm，s
distinction　between　aliud　re〃2　esse　inゴnte〃ectU（fbr　a　thing　to　be　in　the
understa血dhlg）and　aliud’nteUigere　7θ〃l　e∬θ（understanding　that血is　th血g
exists）．　It　is　in　the　second　sense　of‘‘esse”　that　Anselm　refers　to　the　artistls
A　1沁ddh㎞♂　Rdnte叩鵬電abon　of　Karl　Bar血’s　Argum㎝t　fbr　thc㎞ofGod血加e加：1物g囮㎜撫鰯㏄勧1　11
wofk㎞血ese　wo】rds：et　habet　in　intellectu　et　intell’gent　e，∬θ（he　has　it　in　his
understanding　and　he　understandS　fiudges］that　what　he　has　paillted　exists）．
2．・AProposalノわ7　the　Material　Parallelis〃z　betWeen∠置nselm　’s　Argument／br
　　the　ExtStence　of（｝od・andハ侮9δ吻πα急Fbπゆ〃ハlegation　in　the　Matter　of
　　Nirva’　na
　　As　mentioned　earlier，　Anselm曾s　argument　for　the　Existence　ofヤGod
consists　of　three　stages：essentia，　esse，　a血d　existens　sive　subsistens．　In　order
to　arrive　at　the　th血d　stage　of　God，s　existence，　one　has　to　negate　the　stages　of
e∬θη加a血desse　as　these　belong　to　an　object（hl　our　case，　God）ill　such　a
way　that　its　existence　is　presupposed　in　an　act　of　thinking．　For　insofar　as　it　is
conceive（L　it　is　conceived　as　existi血9．　Thus　and　only　thus　one　is　able　to　get
in　touch　with　the　stage　of　ex－sistens　or　sus－sistens　apPlied　to　an　object
CharaCteriZing　it　SimUltaneOUSly　aS　emerging（eX－SiStenS）frOm　the　inner
circle　of　abstract　existence　in　thinking（cf　AFQI，90－1）．
　　This　same　process　of　negating’　the”ultimate　reality　as　existing　in　thought
only”we　can　find　hl　N肖g葡11na，s　fourfold　consideration　of　Nirvi4a　in　tcmms
of　negatiVity．　in　both　cases　the　final　culmination　of　the　process　of　negation
is　absolute　affirmation，　whether　of　the　Existence　of　God　in　Anselm’s
argument　or　of　the　world　of　dependent　co－origination　in　Nagtr巾na°s．121t　is
precisely血tllis　respect　that　a　material　parallelism　between　the　two　systems
exists．
Conclusions．・
　　Notwithstanding　the　material　parallelism　mentioned　above，　since
Anse㎞，s　goal　is　the　proof　of　the　Existence　of　God　while，　on　the　othcr、hand，
NEgaijuna「s　being　’the　absolute　affirmation　ofpratitya－3αη観卯4伽丘om　the
perspective　of　Emptiness，　in　the　sense　that　Emptiness“is”垂窒≠煤utya－
samゆ砒，　there　is　a　difference　betWeen血em．　The　former　refers　to　the
religious　ult㎞ate，　God，　but血e　latter　speaks　of　the　metaphysical　ult㎞ate，
Emptiness．
　　Yet，　this　di脆rence　is　of　a　peculiar　character，　ill　the　sense　that　the　crux　of
the　former　goal，　God，　is　loyal　to　the　crux　of　the　latter　goa　1，　Emptiness，　if　the
Bllddhistic　reinte】rpretation　of　the　Name　of　God（al吻uid　quo　nihil　maius
cogt’伽ゼρo∬めis　tenable　here　at　all．　That　is，　the　difference　leadS　us　now　to
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affinn　the　perspective　of　the　complementarity　of　the　Christian　God　and　the
Buddhist　Emptiness．　If　so，　it　mealls　that　only　by　virtue　of　the　Buddllist
category　of　Emptiness　have　we　arrived　at　the　delimitation　of　the
transformed，　deeper　inclusivism　based　uI）on　t　le　uniVersal　Logos．
　　This　del㎞itation，　however，　does　not　simply　call　fbr　a　passhlg　over　to　the
Buddllist　realm，　Emptiness．　It　also　asserts　the　integral　importance　of　the
vision　of　God　as　the　principle　of　loyalty　in　the　universe；and　with　this　vision
of　God　in　mind　we　come　hack　to　the　Christian　realm　afresh．13　Thus，　the
vision　consists　of　the　two－fbld　significative　fUnction（as　remotive　and
constitUtive）：namely，　God，　on　the　one　hand，　is　loyal　to　noth血gness（nゴhil，
qua　nihiり；however，　on　the　other　hand，　God　is　the　only　One　in　the　universe
wllo　can　and　does　paradoxically　evoke　loyalty　in　us　creatures．
　　In　itself　Nothingness　or　Emptiness，　on　the　contrary，　does　not　evoke
loyalty　in　us　because　it　has　no　empirical　basis　for　doing　so．　However，　it　does
evoke　loyalty　in　us　only　when　it　is　pt㎞ordially　characterized　as　God．14
No伽
　1　Tbis　iS　a　paper　originally　（lelivered　at　the　2吋Buddh面｛加st㎞1　Studies　Con㎞㏄on
　　　‘Buddhism　and　Christianity：　Tovvard　the　Human　Fi血爬，”at（∋raduate　TheolOgica1　Union
　　　and　University　of　Califomieg　Berkeley，　U．S．A．，　August　10－15，1987．　hl　Ievising　the
　　　Odg血al　paper　to　pmduce山is囲text　I　am　indebted　tO　Prefessor　A皿Im　Blonde　and
　　　Profi　ssor　Sanford　Goldstein，　my　co皿eagues　at　Keiwa　C611ege，　for・their・valuable・eritical
　　　suggesti（ms．
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See　Tokiyuki　N6buhara，‘「P血ciples　fbr　hteq）reting（】h副Buddha：Katsumi　Takizawa
and　John　B．　C6bb，　Jr．，”BudlathtSt・Chnistian　Sttidie：s，3，1983，63－97．
See　Toldyuld　N6b蝋‘『Nolmhara　on　Knitter，ハlb　O物1～IOne2∴A（》づ伽1　SurvElソqヂ
G肋伽∠4蛎螂7bw傭1伽〃bハげRθ髭蜜》ns，，，　Bt‘dZthiSt－Chnis伽Stndies，5，1985，
205－213．
Ths　mot証of　cxplo面g重he　delimitation　of　inchus童Vism　as　combined　Wi血血e　Logos　is
proposed血i　my　article：‘‘A　New　Possibility　for　Logos（i　olQgy　Through　Encounter
with　Buddhjsm：Tnlich　and　Takセawa　Cdtica皿y　Cooside顧ed　and　Comp飢”BuUetin｛ゾ
1【εfwロColk　ge，　No．7，1M㎞℃h　30，1998，91－118；N6．8，1＞㎞h　30，1999，107－137．
Katl　Barth，　Anselm’　コFTialas（吻躍厩伽伽’∠4nselm　’s」PtOofofthe　Existence｛ゾ（｝Od
動伽Cb麟qヂ傭7玩oi㎏加l　Scrheme，加ms．㎞W．　Rd舳on（London：SCM　P爬ss，
1960）．（Hereafter　Cited　as　AFQI．）
This　same　intention　was　pursued　within　the　wider　context　of　compa血g　Anse㎞，
Nagaijuneq　and　Whitehead　in　my　article：“How　Can　P血ciples　Be　More　Than　Just
正1｝㎞10gical　Or　Concq血」田し1？：Anselm，　Nagar　juan，　and　Vyhiteh｛燐”PtOce∬7hOughち
No．5，　Sep㎞ber　1993，89－102．
A“Buddh面♂R血1姻ation　of　Karl　Barth巳s　Ar脚t　lbr　tbe舳㎝㏄ofGod㎞加謝’F廊g吻㎜1副㎞　　13
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Paul　Rjcoeu匡，7h　2　Sソbelisw　ofEwil（Boston：Beacon　Press，1967），　PP．347－357．
Theodore　Stchefbatsky，7he’（】onception　of　Bttcldhist　1＞か幅脚，　with　Comprehensive
舳1ysis　and　In加dnction　by　Jaideva　Singh（New　Yod【：Samuel　WeiseらInc．，1978），　p．
56．（Herea血e【cited　as　CBN．）
See　Yokichi　Yajirna，　Kuu　no　tetsugaku（Philosophy　of　Errrptiness）（Tokyo：NHK　Bodks，
1983），pp．226－43．
Dゆgen　Zenji曾s　57〕δムσ9ε顔7’1海・醜姻乃「enSttre　ofthe　Tme・乙ew，　VoL　L　trans．　K｛脚
NiShijirna　and　John　Stevens（Sendai，　Japan：Da血okkaikaku，　19759），　p．130．
Se　e　Tokiyuki　Nbbuhara，‘‘A‘Buddb面c’Reinterpretation　of　Karl　Ba曲璽s　Argument　for
the　Existence　of　God　in　Anselm’Fides　guaerens　lnte〃ectum：Toward　a　Global
Thθology．　A　FUrther　Elabora血on：Pa並P（PtrPubk㎏hed）．　This　is　a　1鵠v㎞and　enlarged
version　of血e　paper　preliminari蓋y　prosented　at　the　Amual　Meeting　of　American
Academy　of　Religion／Western　Region　held　at　Santa　Clara　University，　Santa　Clara，
Califbmia，　Marcb　20－22，1986，　Much　of　Sections　II　and　III　is　new．　I　read　the
㎞h℃duction　and　Sechon　I　only　1血ere．（H紬r　cited　as　BRKB．）
As　to　a　ooll伽ve　study　ofthe　two　cases　ofn¢gadve　lqgic，　see　my　orig圃1ager　paper，
BRKB，31－49．
What　is　expressed　j11面s　sen加n㏄is　at　lhe　oole　of　my　idea　of　a　dleology　of　lqyalty　which
Ihave　develqpθd　mo璽e負】皿y　in　an　anicle　entitled‘Su　lyata，　KeriosiS，　and　J血i　or　Friendly
Compassionate　Love：Teward　a　Buddhist－Christian　Theology　of　Loyalty，”Japanese
R誠即鰐，1514，」亘皿yl989，50－66．
血lwdting面s　last　sen㎞㏄of　the　p1esent　wotk　1　am　ind6bted　to　my　mentor　John　B．
Cobb，　Jr．1s　fbllowing　passage：‘‘But　Whitehead　believes　that　in　actuality，　al止ough
crca鉦vity　iS　completely　wi出｛｝ut　any　charac惚of　itS　o皿it　lb　nevqr　experienced脚
fiem　a　p血o曲al　o面㎎of　lhe　h血rite　array　of　the　forms　o叩uie　pOtentialities．’lhiS
o晦㎏directed　tO　the　Iea血za虚on　of　novel　intensn旺es　of　feeling　in　the　adual　k旭tances
of　creatiVity，止at　iS，血sudh　ereatures　as　ourselves．　Thus　what　is　wllolly　wi血out　c㎞
血亜self　has　be㎝画mo曲ally　c㎞te血ed　by　a　deciSion　tliat　orders　what　iS　possible　for
出esake　of　all　c【ea加rcs．　Whitehead　ca皿s　this　character　of　（rmtivity　the　P血iordial　Na加1e
of　G｛xt　There　is　no　creativi重y　not　characteri2nd　by　this　NatUre”（Bayond　thalogue’
To）vard　a　MUtual　1｝㈱㈱lon　qヂCimtiOnity　and　Bt‘adethism，　Ph皿ade幽Fo繭
Press，1982，　p．126）．
　CObb　has　ereatively　used　the　notion　of　the　P血iordial　Na加re　of　（oOd　in　parallel　Wi血
dle　Amida　Buddha　as　the＆z〃ibhogakOya　in　the　capacity　of‘‘the　Dh〃makOya　as
harac酬by　w㎞and　oon口passion，，（P．127），　thus　cultivating　a　new　averiue　tr｝wald
an　effective　dialogue　with　Pure　Land　Buddllists丘om　a　Whiteheadian－Christian
脚ve．　h　my　case，血曲n　of出e　loyalty　of（漁㎞㎜面ve調◎o懸舳ve
signification・　iS　pivo観血11e1舳91he　s撚of（㎞h11血e　universeむD　1血e　Whimheadian
erea血vi重y　as◎o蜘ble　tO　Buddhist　Errrp血less．　It　may　be　1血e　case止飢1血e　Whiteheadian
notion　of　God　as　the‘‘p血nordial　Qharacter　of　creativity　which　is　utIcrly　devoid　of
character　and　actuali重y”and　the‘‘d㎞vilyωwald出e　rea　jiZation　of　novel　intensities　of
feeling　jh　us，，　are騨vely　correlative　tO　my　idea　of　God，s　loyalty　tO　Emp血ess　and
（M，s　cvocation　of　byahy血us．　It　has　been　a　joyfUl　expcrience　tO　corrrPlete廿血s　essay
14
while　ascertaining　the　tUth　of　my　insight　by　stUdying　Barth，　Anseli叫and　Nag両una
候）gelher．
